Monday, December 31, 2018

Video: Usaama al-Azami - "Law & Ethics in the Wake of the Arab Revolutions" (2016)

V

The Independent: Toblerone becomes target of far-right boycott after halal certification (Dec 20 2018)

Swiss chocolate maker attacked by anti-Islam protesters after revealing its products are suitable for Muslims

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/toblerone-halal-boycott-germany-afd-switzerland-chocolate-a8692531.html

Talal Asad on the effect of claiming a Christian heritage for European secularism

This view of the Christian origins of secularism, of secular ideas as a modern translation of Christianity, has been contested by those who argue that secularization has its own genealogy, one that represents a profound break from religion and enchantment -- a break that is marked by the emergence of modern science and modern politics. 
I'll turn briefly to this debate in a moment, but first I want to pose a question. Why is it important for self-described secularists to claim a Christian heritage? Personal motives are obviously difficult to establish at this level, but one can clearly see what the effect of such a claim is: the political exclusion of all those who cannot claim that heritage.
What proponents of this thesis mean when they refer to Christianity is, of course, European Christianity, which, in the early encounter of Europeans with non-Europeans (especially with the construction of European empires dominating non-Europeans), became an important part of their identity.  
There were of course forms of Christianity in Eastern Europe, Northeast Africa, and West Asia, but these were dismissed as irrational or decadent forms of essential Christianity. 
The redefinition of the heritage from which Europe claims to derive secularity as Judeo-Christian comes at the end of a long history of Christian ambivalence towards Jews, ending with the Nazi Holocaust; the new term is, like so many other connected moves, designed to be taken as a sign of genuine repentance and reconciliation, but it is a Christian perspective on the outmoded place of Jews in theological history. [3] The claim to a Judeo-Christian heritage is now invoked by secularists in the European Union as a grammatical exclusion of Muslims
--Talal Asad, Secular Translations: Nation-State, Modern Self, and Calculative Reason (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 2-3.

Hartford Seminary Alum Maggie Siddiqi Has New Job with Center for American Progress

Thursday, December 27, 2018

Book: Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism: Illiberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy (2017)

The liberatory sentiment that stoked the Arab Spring and saw the ousting of long-time Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak seems a distant memory. Democratically elected president Mohammad Morsi lasted only a year before he was forced from power to be replaced by precisely the kind of authoritarianism protestors had been railing against in January 2011. Paradoxically, this turn of events was encouraged by the same liberal activists and intelligentsia who'd pushed for progressive reform under Mubarak.

This volume analyses how such a key contingent of Egyptian liberals came to develop outright illiberaltendencies. Interdisciplinary in scope, it brings together experts in Middle East studies, political science, philosophy, Islamic studies and law to address the failure of Egyptian liberalism in a holistic manner - from liberalism's relationship with the state, to its role in cultivating civil society, to the role of Islam and secularism in the cultivation of liberalism. A work of impeccable scholarly rigour, Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism reveals the contemporary ramifications of the state of liberalism in Egypt.

Contents

1. Egyptian liberals, from revolution to counterrevolution
Daanish Faruqi and Dalia F. Fahmy
Section I: Liberalism and The Egyptian State

2. Egypt's structural illiberalism: How a weak party system undermines participatory politics
Dalia F. Fahmy

3. Nasser's comrades and Sadat's brothers: Institutional legacies and the downfall of the Second Egyptian Republic
Hesham Sallam

4. (De)liberalizing judicial independence in Egypt
Sahar F. Aziz

Section II: Liberalism and Egyptian Civil Society

5. The authoritarian state's power over civil society
Ann M. Lesch

6. Myth or reality?: The discursive construction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
Mohamad Elmasry

7. Student political activism in democratizing Egypt
Abdel-Fattah Mady

Section III: Islam, Secularism, and the State

8. Egypt's secularized intelligentsia and the guardians of truth
Khaled Abou El Fadl

9. The truncated debate: Egyptian liberals, Islamists, and ideological statism
Ahmed Abdel Meguid and Daanish Faruqi


Section IV: Egyptian Liberals in Comparative Perspective Post-2013

10. Conflict and reconciliation: "Arab liberalism” in Syria and Egypt
Emran El-Badawi

11. Egypt's new liberal crisis
Joel Gordon

12. Egyptian liberals and their anti-democratic deceptions: A contemporary sad narrative
Amr Hamzawy

Conclusion: Does liberalism have a future in Egypt?
Emad El-Din Shahin

Mawlid al-Nabi - Dr. Sherman Jackson

Faith and the Challenges of Secularism: A Jewish-Christian-Muslim Trialogue (Nov. 6, 2017)



An afternoon conversation on the role of faith communities in an increasingly secular world among leaders within the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions, featuring: Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, Dr. Robert P. George, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf. This is the inaugural event of the Robert P. George Initiative on Faith, Ethics and Public Policy at Baylor University. A special thank you to our event co-sponsors: the American Enterprise Institute's Values & Capitalism Program and The Witherspoon Institute. Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks is an international religious leader, philosopher, award-winning author, and respected moral voice. He was awarded the 2016 Templeton Prize in recognition of his “exceptional contributions to affirming life’s spiritual dimension.” A frequent and sought-after contributor to radio, television, and the press both in Britain and around the world, Rabbi Sacks is the author of over 30 books, including the recent bestseller Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence. Since stepping down as the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth — a position he served for 22 years between 1991 and 2013 – Rabbi Sacks has held a number of professorships at several academic institutions, including Yeshiva University and King’s College London. He currently serves as the Ingeborg and Ira Rennert Global Distinguished Professor at New York University. Rabbi Sacks has been awarded 17 honorary doctorates, including a Doctor of Divinity conferred to mark his first 10 years in office as Chief Rabbi, by the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey. Dr. Robert P. George is the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University. He is also the Herbert W. Vaughan Fellow of the Witherspoon Institute and has been a Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School. In August 2017, Baylor University launched the Robert P. George Initiative on Faith, Ethics, and Public Policy; and Professor George was appointed as a Distinguished Senior Fellow in the Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion. He has served as chairman of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and as a presidential appointee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. He also has served on the President’s Council on Bioethics and as the U.S. member of UNESCO’s World Commission on the Ethics of Science and Technology. He was a Judicial Fellow at the Supreme Court of the United States, where he received the Justice Tom C. Clark Award. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Swarthmore College, he holds degrees in law and theology from Harvard and the degrees of D.Phil., B.C.L., and D.C.L. from Oxford University, in addition to 18 honorary degrees. He is a recipient of the U.S. Presidential Citizens Medal and the Honorific Medal for the Defense of Human Rights of the Republic of Poland, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. His most recent book is "Conscience and Its Enemies" (ISI Books). Shaykh Hamza Yusuf is president and senior faculty member of Zaytuna College, America’s first accredited Muslim liberal arts college. He is an advisor to the Center for Islamic Studies at Berkeley’s Graduate Theological Union. In addition, he serves as vice president for the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies (Abu Dhabi), which was founded and is currently presided over by Shaykh Abdallah bin Bayyah, one of the top jurists and masters of Islamic sciences in the world. He is the author of several books and scholarly articles and has translated major creedal Islamic texts into English. Books he has authored or translated include "Purification of the Heart," "The Content of Character," "The Creed of Imam al-Tahawi," "Caesarean Moon Births," "Prayer of the Oppressed," and "Agenda to Change our Condition." Recently, Hamza Yusuf was ranked as “the Western world’s most influential Islamic scholar” by The Muslim 500, edited by John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin. Along with his extensive training in the Western liberal arts, Yusuf has studied Arabic and the Islamic sciences for over 40 years with leading scholars of the Muslim world. For more information on Baylor University's work in our nation's capital, please visit: www.baylor.edu/washington.

Conscience and Its Enemies: A Conversation with Robert P. George and Hamza Yusuf (December 15, 2014)

Saudi king orders major reshuffle of top government posts (Dec 27 2018)

Robert P. George Warns: Militant Secularists 'Want Your Kids' (Oct. 25, 2017)

Wednesday, December 26, 2018

Is Islam Compatible with Free-Market Capitalism? An Empirical Analysis, 1970–2010

Abstract:
Are majority-Muslim countries laggards when it comes to developing liberal economic institutions? Using an Index of Economic Freedom and its component parts, this study finds that Muslim-dominant countries (>50% of the population) are positively associated with free-market capitalism. Protestant dominance is also positively correlated, but the association stems from just two components of the index, mainly “legal security and property rights protection.” Surprisingly, Protestant countries correlate negatively with “small government” and “freedom to trade,” two critical components of free-market capitalism. Muslim dominance shows positive correlations with all areas except for “legal security and property rights.” The results are consistent when assessing similar variables measuring property rights and government ownership of the economy collected by the Varieties of Democracy Project. Capitalistic policies and institutions, it seems, may travel across religions more easily than culturalists claim.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-religion/article/is-islam-compatible-with-freemarket-capitalism-an-empirical-analysis-19702010/1A123E7925A9E2ED02643376F9FA552E

via Prof. Fadel

Dr. Jackson on American Muslims between liberals and conservatives

I agree with Brian that many Muslim activists and organizations have thrown their lot in with liberal allies, presumably as quid pro quo for defending Muslims. Personally (and I claim no monopoly on truth here), I believe this is a mistake; I do not believe we can preserve Islam in America without preserving religion. And I see the left as supporting only domesticated forms of religion that applaud the state and the dominant culture while never ­seriously challenging either. Yet religious conservatives—not just Evangelicals—tend to look the elephant right in the face but only curse his shadow. They act as if they can protect Christianity and America by keeping Islam and other non-­Christian religions at bay, while liberalism, secularism, and ­scientism continue to degrade religion’s plausibility structure to the point of ­threatening Christianity’s health and viability. In this context, one must wonder what opportunities actually exist for Muslims to ally with Christian conservatives and what advantage Muslims might actually gain from such a relationship.
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2019/01/letters 

R.R. Reno on Sherman Jackson on Muslim Americans and the “liberal-pluralist vision” (Feb 3, 2017)

In his 2005 book, Islam and the Blackamerican, ­Jackson makes a case for Muslim endorsement of the American political system and its “liberal-pluralist vision.” At first glance, this vision contradicts Islam’s view of moral truth, for it “protects the rights of gays, atheists, and witches to be gays, atheists, and witches.” Doesn’t our loyalty to God’s law mean we must resist a modern regime that isn’t just tolerant of disobedience of divine law, but affirms a positive right to sin? This is a question many of us must face as well.
Jackson makes an important distinction between liberal pluralism as a cultural ideal and as a set of political arrangements. In the present moment, the former makes diversity, inclusion, and non-judgmentalism obligatory, and thus rejects all traditional modes of life, especially religious ones, as authoritarian and intolerant. Needless to say, Islam is opposed to liberal pluralism as obligatory cultural ideal—as are orthodox Christianity and Judaism. But liberal pluralism can refer to something more modest, a political system and civic tradition that recognize the limits of law and accord room for dissent and deviance. Islam can affirm this kind of liberal pluralism, argues Jackson, and he provides evidence from Islamic sources to show that, even in circumstances where Muslims had surpassing political power, there was support for practical acceptance of pluralism and civic accommodation of “non-Muslim beliefs and behaviors that violated Islam.”
This tradition of pragmatic accommodation of non-Islamic beliefs and practices guides Jackson’s assessment of America’s constitutional regime. The Constitution was obviously written by non-Muslims. Traditional Islamic jurisprudence is aware of such circumstances and exhorts Muslims “to honor treaties and agreements brokered by non-Muslims.” Jackson applies this principle to our political compact. When a faithful Muslim participates in American society, he accepts the terms of citizenship. This acceptance is not religious, and therefore does not offend against Islam’s requirement of spiritual loyalty.
Moreover, Jackson argues that Muslims should offer enthusiastic support for our political arrangements. “According to the Constitution, the U.S. government cannot force a Muslim to renounce his or her faith; it cannot deny him or her the right to pray, fast, or perform the pilgrimage; it cannot force him or her to eat pork, shave his beard, or remove her scarf.” In fact, “The U.S. government cannot even force a Muslim (qua Muslim) to pledge allegiance to the United States!” Under the circumstances, fixing on “dogmatic minutiae, activist rhetoric, and uncritical readings of Islamic law and history” to argue that a faithful Muslim cannot affirm the American constitutional regime is worse than foolhardy.
Jackson goes on to clarify the theological legitimacy of the First Amendment’s prohibition of religious establishment. A proponent of liberal-pluralist culture makes the separation of church and state into a foundational principle that bans religion from public life. For obvious reasons, a Muslim must reject this as an antireligious dogmatism (as must any sensible Christian or Jew). But as a practical solution to the problems posed by the sociological reality of religious pluralism, a Muslim can endorse the separation of church and state as wise policy.
Taking a page out of the First Things playbook, ­Jackson urges Muslim Americans to “articulate the practical benefits of the rules of Islamic law in terms that gain them recognition by society at large,” something that can be done by drawing on the Islamic tradition of practical reasoning that has family resemblances to the Catholic use of natural law and Protestant analysis of “common grace.” Christians rightly enter into public life, seeking to leaven our laws with the wisdom of Scripture and church tradition, not asserting claims on the basis of church authority, but arguing for them in the give-and-take of civic discourse. Muslims should do the same, seeking to bring forward policy proposals “that are grounded in the vision and values of Islam.”
Sherman Jackson is an influential voice in the Muslim American community, and his endorsement of liberal-­pluralist constitutionalism resists Islamic extremism that poses as religious integrity and helps Muslims in the United States to affirm our way of life, which their natural sympathies incline them to do. Which is why I do not regard Islam as a “problem” in the United States. The real threats come from post-Christians. It was not faithful Muslims who decided Roe v. Wade. They weren’t the ones working to suppress religious freedom in recent years. The people who formulated the HHS contraceptive mandate were not influenced by Shari’a law. On the contrary, as G. K. Chesterton observed, the vices of the modern era are Christian virtues gone mad. The greatest threat to the future of the West is the post-Christian West.
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2017/02/islam-and-america

Richard Eaton – Islam in India (2016)





Richard Eaton is Professor of History at the University of Arizona. His research interests focus on the social and cultural history of medieval and early modern India (1000-1800), and especially on the range of interactions between Islamic and Indian cultures that took place at that time. He is also active in the growing subfield of world history, as well as comparative history. He has published monographs on the social roles of Sufis (Muslim mystics) in the Indian sultanate of Bijapur (1300-1700), on the growth of Islam in Bengal (1204-1760), and on the social history of the Deccan from 1300 to 1761. Most recently, he co-authored a monograph entitled Power, Memory, Architecture: Contested Sites on India's Deccan Plateau, 1300-1600. These four historical monographs employ as analytical tools, respectively, Weberian social thought, Annales School methodology, biography, and architecture.


He is also the recipient of multiple book awards including the Albert Hourani Book Award for the best book in Middle Eastern Studies and the A. K. Coomaraswamy Book Award for the best book in South Asian Studies, as well as three film awards for his 2002 film on European contact with Asia entitled, “Through the Looking Glass.”

Tuesday, December 18, 2018

James Baldwin at UC Berkeley Q&A 1974

https://youtu.be/8klsr2TB5pA

New book: The Muslim Reception of European Orientalism: Reversing the Gaze


"Edward Said’s Orientalism, now more than fifty years old, has to be one of the most frequently cited books among academics in a wide range of disciplines, and the most frequently assigned book to undergraduates at colleges.
Among the common questions raised in response to Said’s book: Did scholars in Western Europe provide crucial support to the imperialist, colonialist activities of European regimes? Are their writings on Islam laden with denigrating, eroticized, distorting biases that have left an indelible impact on Western society? What is the "Orientalism" invented by Europe and what is its impact today?
However, one question has been less raised (or less has been done about the question): How were the Orientalist writings of European scholars of Islam received among their Muslim contemporaries? An international team of contributors rectify this oversight in this volume."
Table of Contents
List of figures
Acknowledgements
List of contributors
Susannah Heschel and Umar Ryad: Introduction
1. Tarek el-Ariss, On Cooks and Crooks: Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq and the Orientalists in England and France (1840s-1850s)
2. Kathryn Anne Schwartz, Experiencing Orientalism: Amin al-Madani and the Sixth Oriental Congress, Leiden, 1883
3. Said F. Hassen and Abdallah Omran, The Reception of the Brill Encyclopedia of Islam: An Egyptian Debate on the Credibility of Orientalism
4. Katalin Rac, Arabic Literature for the Colonizer and the Colonized: Ignaz Goldziher and Hungary’s Eastern Politics 1878-1918
5. Roy Bar Sadeh, Islamic Modernism between Colonialism and Orientalism: Al-Manar's Intellectual Circles and Aligarh's Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, 1898-1914.
6. Aaron Glasserman, The Frustrating Authority of Mr. Wells: Islam and the Politics of Orientalism in Republican China
7. Susannah Heschel, Orientalist Triangulations: Jewish Scholarship on Islam as a Response to Christian Europe
8. Ruchama Johnston-Bloom, "Dieses wirklich westöstlichen Mannes": The German-Jewish Orientalist Josef Horovitz in Germany, India, and Palestine
9. Mostafa Hussein, Scholarship on Islamic Archaeology Between Zionism and Arab Nationalist Movements
10. Mehdi Sajid, A Muslim Convert to Christianity as an Orientalist in Europe – The Case of the Moroccan Franciscan Jean-Mohammed Abdeljalil

Wednesday, December 12, 2018

Muntasir Zaman: Ḥadīth Scholarship in the Indian Subcontinent: Mawlānā Aḥmad ʿAlī al-Sahāranpūrī and the First Print of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī

James Traub: The Middle East’s Age of Innocence Is Over (March 20, 2018)

Brookings Institute: "Islam as statecraft: How Governments Use Religion in Foreign Policy" by Peter Mandaville & Shadi Hamid (Nov 2018)

Letters by Prof. Sherman Jackson, Rashid Dar, Ismail Royer & Charles Glenn re: Paul Rowan Brian (“Muslims in American Politics,” November)

https://www.firstthings.com/article/2019/01/letters

Paul Rowan Brian seems to think that Muslim “orthodoxy” is uncompromisingly anti-liberal, but this is demonstrably not the case. Muslim orthodoxy, even in pre-modern times, has always recognized the right of non-Muslims to do things Islam deems morally repugnant, from consuming wine to marrying ­incestuously. Such “tolerance” in an American context falls perfectly in line with the “liberalism” of the left.
Meanwhile, contrary to Brian, “conservative” Muslims do not necessarily betray their religious convictions every time they compromise on a pre-modern position. Islam has a palpable prudential element, and its fundamental “conservative” commitment is not to the substance of past positions per se, but to the authority of the texts, precedents, and time-honored interpretive principles by which these are ratified. In its best tradition, Muslim “conservatism” has always been a negotiated ­enterprise.
Brian would be right to see Islam’s conservative impulse as clashing with liberalism were liberalism understood as an epistemology instead of a concrete battery of moral positions. For one can oppose liberal epistemology, for example, in the form of liberal versions of “freedom,” “consent,” “reason,” and the like, without necessarily negating liberal positions, such as allowing non-Muslims to eat pork or have abortions. Even the most assiduous commitment to the texts, precedents, and interpretive principles enshrined in Muslim tradition can yield “liberal” positions, just as it can yield “conservative” ones.
In this light, we might revisit ­Brian’s reference to Hamza Yusuf, Omar Suleiman, Zaid Shakir, and myself. Leaving aside whether these men are in full agreement, are their views on race, foreign policy, the environment, and workers’ rights liberal or Islamic? Are Shakir’s views on feminism conservative or Islamic? In short, given Muslim tradition’s interpretive ambidextrousness, why should these scholars’ espousal of the views Brian cites be seen as an intentional act of siding with “the left”?
I agree with Brian that many Muslim activists and organizations have thrown their lot in with liberal allies, presumably as quid pro quo for defending Muslims. Personally (and I claim no monopoly on truth here), I believe this is a mistake; I do not believe we can preserve Islam in America without preserving religion. And I see the left as supporting only domesticated forms of religion that applaud the state and the dominant culture while never ­seriously challenging either. Yet religious conservatives—not just Evangelicals—tend to look the elephant right in the face but only curse his shadow. They act as if they can protect Christianity and America by keeping Islam and other non-­Christian religions at bay, while liberalism, secularism, and ­scientism continue to degrade religion’s plausibility structure to the point of ­threatening Christianity’s health and viability. In this context, one must wonder what opportunities actually exist for Muslims to ally with Christian conservatives and what advantage Muslims might actually gain from such a relationship.
All of this begs Brian’s ultimate question of whether “American Muslims [will] define a place for themselves in American political culture.” Of course, we should avoid the temptation to see Muslims as a monolith. There will be Muslims whose views are motivated by liberalism, Muslims who are inspired by American conservatism, and Muslims whose highest priority is that their political views not run afoul of Muslim tradition. As long as all remain American citizens, all will have a place in American political culture. Perhaps the real ­question, however, is ­whether Muslims must accept the existing political culture in America as an ­unassailable given to which they must simply “adjust.” Might not the tradition of Islam (the optics of the ­contemporary Muslim world notwithstanding) provide insights, experience, and lessons that enrich America’s political culture and expand its possibilities beyond the present paralysis of the liberal-conservative, secular-religious divide? God knows best. 
Sherman A. Jackson
university of southern 
california
los angeles, california

Tuesday, December 11, 2018

Foreign Policy: Saudi Arabia Declares War on America’s Muslim Congresswomen (Dec 11 2018)

Gulf Arab monarchies are using racism, bigotry, and fake news to denounce Washington's newest history-making politicians.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/11/saudi-arabia-declares-war-on-americas-muslim-congresswomen/

Shaykh Bin Bayyah on Terrorism, Governance & Justice

It is the first of these -- matters of governance -- that relate to the issue of terrorism. The United States government believes that bringing democracy to Muslim nations will, in general, solve many ills affecting Muslim societies and, in particular, resolve the problem of terrorism. Lost in this emphasis on democracy is the value of justice. Islam insists that justice is at the heart of good governance. The Qur'an says: God commands you to repay pledges to the people due them; and to judge with justice when you judge between people. Excellent is what God instructs you; for God is all-knowing, all seeing (4:58) It is narrated that when 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz was informed by his deputy about the Khawārij, he wrote back saying: "Extinguish their sedition with justice."
Justice is a cure, but inherent in it is the preservation of life, property, human dignity, and fulfilling the rights of others. This is what 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb meant in his letter to Abū Mūsā, when he wrote, "It is enough for an impoverished Muslim that he is treated justly in government and has his fair share in the distribution of wealth." Leaders are accountable before God even in how they respond to natural disasters, let alone how they redress any wrongs.

 --Dr. 'Abd Allāh Bin al-Sheikh Mahfūẓ Bin Bayyah, The Culture of Terrorism: Tenets and Treatments, tr. by Hamza Yusuf, (Sandala & Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, 2014), p. 10.

"This publication is based upon a lecture deliver by Shaykh 'Abd Allāh bin Bayyah at the headquarters of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Jeddah, 2007." 

Monday, December 10, 2018

The Problem of “Political Sufism”

The dilemma these so-called political Sufis face today, (many of whom I still respect and love) is one of moral and ethical consistency with their spiritual forefathers and listening to their detractors with more empathy and humility.  Polemical critiques of misguided Muslims/extremists cannot come at the expense of turning a blind eye to injustices wrought by state-sponsored autocracy and military pillaging. The problem with “political Sufism” today therefore, is not that such a phenomenon exists, it is how it manifests. In these politically precarious times, perhaps it is more characteristically Sufi to first listen to the calling of the soul of those “whose hair are disheveled and bodies covered with dust and who are pushed away from the door due to their apparent wretchedness” (Hadith) rather than vying for the approval of those spinning webs of tyranny, sitting in their gold-clad mansions.
https://blogs.harvard.edu/ihsanism/2018/12/11/the-problem-of-political-sufism/

Muntasir Zaman: Ḥadīth Scholarship in the Indian Subcontinent: Mawlānā Aḥmad ʿAlī al-Sahāranpūrī and the First Print of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī

Sunday, December 9, 2018

Guenon on modernity and humanity's descent

To the standard European conviction of the possibility and the desirability of progress, Guenon replied that progress was an illusion masking regression. Changes that most Europeans saw as improvements were actually degeneration. The growth of individualism, for example, did not bring any real freedom, but rather the atomization and homogenization of society, and so the reduction of real freedom (Guenon 1945). The decline that Guenon saw everywhere was, he argued, inevitable. The true direction of humanity's movement was not ascent but descent. Modernity constituted the last and lowest stage of this descent. [8]
-Mark Sedgwick, "Guenonian Traditionalism and European Islam," in Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and dissemination in Western Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), ed. Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi, p. 172.

the "local" and "global" re: Guenon, "Traditionalism" & contemporary Islamic discourse

An examination of Traditionalism also shows quite how global contemporary Islamic discourse has become, and thus warns of the possible dangers of examining Islam in a purely European context. Although Islam is surely becoming localized in Europe today, and although examining Islam in a purely European context permits many valuable insights, the twenty-first century promises to be a century of ever increasing globalization. The Islamic discourse currently taking place in languages such as English is not limited to any particular region of the world.

-Mark Sedgwick, "Guenonian Traditionalism and European Islam," in Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and dissemination in Western Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), ed. Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi, p. 169.  

Saturday, December 8, 2018

Lee Bollinger: Half a Century of Free Press Now at Risk

International Mustafa el-A‘zamî Symposium

What will happen to Dorothy Day’s former church? (Dec 4 2018)

The Teachers Who Inspired J.D. Salinger and a Generation of American Writers

Nicholas Kristof: Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children (Dec 7, 2018)

“The Saudi war in Yemen has already lasted three years. Some 85,000 kids have died. And it’s all supported by America.” Oped by Nicholas Kristof of NYT

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/opinion/sunday/yemen-famine-war-saudi-arabia.html

How Islamic is "Islamic Studies"? Shaykh Abdal Hakim Murad, Distinguishe...





https://youtu.be/cGNyFVXrBqs

Friday, December 7, 2018

Abu Dhabi's problem with the Muslim Brotherhood (May 26 2018)

How the United Arab Emirates' broad definition of 'extremism' has impacted regional politics since 2011.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/abu-dhabi-problem-muslim-brotherhood-180526105937656.html

In A First, Emirati Foreign Minister Defends Trump Visa Ban (Feb 1, 2017)

The United Arab Emirates' top diplomat on Wednesday came out in defense of President Donald Trump's order temporarily barring citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States.

The comments by Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Gulf federation's foreign minister, could help bolster the administration's assertion that the directive was not intended as a ban against Muslims.

The UAE minister said the U.S. was within its rights to take what he said was a "sovereign decision" concerning immigration - the first such remarks in support of Trump's move from the Gulf Arab region - and he voiced faith in the American administration's assurances that the move was not based on religion.

Sheikh Abdullah also noted that most of the world's Muslim-majority countries were not covered by the order, which halts entry for 90 days to citizens of Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen.

"This is a temporary ban and it will be revised in three months, so it is important that we put into consideration this point," he said following talks with his Russian counterpart in the Emirati capital, Abu Dhabi.

"Some of these countries that were on this list are countries that face structural problems," he continued. "These countries should try to solve these issues ... and these circumstances before trying to solve this issue with the United States."

The Emirates is one of the United States' closest Arab allies. It is part of the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State group and hosts American troops and warplanes taking part in the anti-IS campaign. It is also home to a center backed by the U.S. that aims to counter extremist propaganda online.

The seven-state federation prides itself on being a tolerant, forward-looking nation that also embraces its traditional Arab and Islamic heritage. The local population is dwarfed some four-to-one by foreign residents, many of whom are not Muslim.

Trump made a point of speaking with the powerful Abu Dhabi crown prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, and Saudi King Salman in his first calls to Arab allies this week. Sheikh Mohammed is the foreign minister's brother and is likely to be the next Emirati president.

America's largest Arab export market, the Emirates also has commercial connections to the new U.S. president.

Trump has lent his name to a soon-to-open golf course and real-estate project being developed in the Emirati city of Dubai, the Middle East's commercial hub. The Abu Dhabi tourism office is a tenant of Trump Tower in New York.

Sheikh Abdullah and Sergey Lavrov discussed a range of regional issues including the war in Syria during their meeting, which included Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Trump's order also includes a suspension of refugee admissions for 120 days, and bans Syrian refugees from entering indefinitely.

Lavrov expressed a willingness to engage with the new U.S. administration on the establishment of safe zones in Syria, something that Trump has expressed interest in creating. But he suggested more details were needed.
"As I understand it, when the Americans are talking about safe zones, first of all they are interested in reducing the number of immigrants - especially through Syria - from going to the West," he said.

https://www.voanews.com/a/emirati-foreign-minister-defends-trump-visa-ban/3702276.html 

UAE minister defends Trump travel ban, says not anti-Islam (Feb 1 2017)

Sheikh Abdullah reflects on Zayed’s legacy at British Museum gallery opening (Sept 7 2018)

The Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan Gallery will house artifacts relating to agricultural development

https://www.thenational.ae/uae/heritage/sheikh-abdullah-reflects-on-zayed-s-legacy-at-british-museum-gallery-opening-1.767974

UAE's concern over the MB in the UK & levering arm sales (Dec 17 2015)

Last month the Guardian revealed that the United Arab Emirates, dominated by the oil-rich emirate of Abu Dhabi, threatened to block billion-pound arms deals with the UK, stop inward investment and cut intelligence cooperation if Britain did not act against the Muslim Brotherhood, which it regards as a terrorist outfit.
The review was conducted by Sir John Jenkins, Britain’s former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and it is understood to call for closer monitoring of the Brotherhood and its affiliates. The review’s findings were due to be published in July 2014 but has been long delayed, with no explanation from Downing Street.
It is understood the government will now publish the findings as a motion in parliament – effectively denying the Brotherhood a chance to judicially review the way in which it was published.
A trio of the UK’s closest allies in the Arab world – Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have all complained that London is a base for the Muslim Brotherhood, which began and was developed in Egypt.
These Arab nations have all outlawed the Brotherhood and accused it of links to terrorism. The Muslim Brotherhood denies this, saying it is a peaceful political movement.
Ali said that Crispin Blunt, the chair of the foreign affairs select committee, had considered his complaint about how the government had been apparently influenced and had said he “intends to run an inquiry into the government’s position towards political Islam which will cover many of the issues raised”.
The revelations in the Guardian exposed the UAE’s widescale lobbying of prime minister and key diplomats as well as Whitehall’s machinery being put at the service of Gulf sheikhs.
In documents seen by the Guardian the UAE offered Cameron lucrative arms and oil deals for British business which would have generated billions of pounds for BAE Systems and allowed BP to bid to drill for hydrocarbons in the Gulf.
Jenkins, on a visit to Abu Dhabi in 2014, had been told that the trust between Britain and the Gulf state “has been challenged due to the UK position towards the Muslim Brotherhood” because “our ally is not seeing it as we do: an existential threat not just to the UAE but to the region”.
The UAE, which is dominated by the oil-rich emirate of Abu Dhabi, had begun raising the stakes with Cameron a day after the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi was declared Egypt’s first democratically elected president in June 2012.
Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, met the prime minister at No 10 and was briefed to express the UAE’s concern over the implications of Morsi’s victory.
The plans appeared to be for the UAE to offer a series of carrots for UK business and the country’s military in return for action against the Brotherhood.
Other senior politicians have long wondered why the government is so bothered by the Brotherhood. Last month Paddy Ashdown said the prime minister had ordered an inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood which ended up concluding the group were not extremists – and that was “unhelpful to the Saudis”.
Downing St said that House of Commons business is posted on the parliamentary website: “We do not comment on anything in advance of its publication.”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/muslim-brotherhood-legal-challenge-government-report-uae-arms 

"Holding the Ruler Accountable"

Although Imām al-Nawawī occupied himself in teaching, writing, and worship, he did not isolate himself from society; rather he put himself at the service of the people. He continually made Islam's demands for social justice known to the rulers. The ruler of his time was Sultan Baybars, the powerful Mamluk ruler of Egypt and Greater Syria who crushed the Mongols in the famous battle of 'Ayn Jālūt in Palestine, on Friday 25 Ramadan 658/3 September 1260. 
Baybars also inflicted a devastating defeat on King Louis IX of France, thus ultimately removing the foreign threat of both the Mongols and Crusaders. Toward the end of his reign, Sultan Baybars and Imām al-Nawawī had a famous public disagreement. Sultan Baybars had placed a heavy tax on the people to finance his continued campaigns against the Mongols and the crusaders. He asked the scholars to issue a legal judgment (fatwa) that justified his taxation policy, and all but Imām al-Nawawī acquiesced. Baybars invited al-Nawawī to his palace and asked him to sign the fatwa. Imām al-Nawawī refused to sign the document and said: 
I have heard that you have one thousand slaves and each one of them possesses a large amount of gold. In addition, you own two hundred concubines, and each of them has a vessel full of jewelry. If you donate all these treasures to fund your campaigns, I will give you a legal judgment (fatwa) to collect your taxes from the people. 
[fn 31: al-Diqr, al-Imām al-Nawawī, 108.] 
In his anger, Sultan Baybars ordered the Imām to leave Damascus. Al-Nawawī replied, "I hear and obey" and returned to Nawā. The scholars urged the sultan to reconsider. Later, the sultan wrote to Imām al-Nawawī, requesting him to come back to Damascus. Imām al-Nawawī replied, "I will never enter Damascus as long as Baybars is in it." Within a month of writing his reply, Sultan Baybars died and al-Nawawī returned to Damascus. [fn 32: Ibid.]
--Rafik Berjak, "About the Author" in The Devotion of Imām al-Nawawī: Translation, Introduction and Commentary by Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, (Bristol, England: Amal Press, 2017), pp. 30-31.

Maydan Podcast: Politics & Society: Peter Mandaville and Shahed Amanullah

We are excited to launch The Maydan Podcast with a discussion between Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University Senior Fellow Peter Mandaville and Shahed Amanullah, co-founder and Chief Technology Officer of Affinis Labs—one of the most influential Muslim figures in the worlds of technology and social entrepreneurship. Their wide-ranging conversation about Muslims and technology covers a broad set of timely issues, including the impact of the Internet on traditional structures of religious authority in the Muslim world; the little known story of the pioneering role played by Muslims in the Silicon Valley venture capital scene; and how technology, social media, and new apps are changing the way Muslims think about their religious identity and practice.

https://www.themaydan.com/2018/11/shahed-amanullah-maydan-podcast/

On Ed Husain

Yemen: inquiry finds Saudis diverting arms to factions loyal to their cause

Yemen ceasefire resolution blocked at UN after Saudi and UAE 'blackmail' (Nov 29 2018)

Matthew Hedges says UAE asked him to spy on Britain

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/05/matthew-hedges-says-uae-asked-him-to-spy-on-britain

Student who was accused of spying and detained for nearly seven months speaks about his ordeal

Uighur leaders warn China's actions could be 'precursors to genocide'

George Monbiot: How US billionaires are fuelling the hard-right cause in Britain (Dec 7 2018)

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/07/us-billionaires-hard-right-britain-spiked-magazine-charles-david-koch-foundation

That Spiked magazine’s US funding arm received $300,000 from the Charles Koch Foundation suggests a hidden agenda

On Sara Khan, UK Government's appointment of new anti-extremism chief

(Book) A Revolution Undone: Egypt's Road Beyond Revolt by HA Hellyer

Amid the turbulence of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the revolutionary uprising that played out in Cairo's Tahrir Square created high expectations before dashing the hopes of its participants. The upheaval led to a sequence of events in Egypt that scarcely anyone could have predicted, and precious few have understood: five years on, the status of Egypt's unfinished revolution remains shrouded in confusion. Power shifted hands rapidly, first from protesters to the army leadership, then to the politicians of the Muslim Brotherhood, and then back to the army. The politics of the street has given way to the politics of Islamist-military détentes and the undoing of the democratic experiment. Meanwhile, a burgeoning Islamist insurgency occupies the army in Sinai and compounds the nation's sense of uncertainty. 

A Revolution Undone blends analysis and narrative, charting Egypt's journey from Tahrir to Sisi from the perspective of an author and analyst who lived it all. H.A. Hellyer brings his first-hand experience to bear in his assessment of Egypt's experiment with protest and democracy. And by scrutinizing Egyptian society and public opinion, Islamism and Islam, the military and government, as well as the West's reaction to events, Hellyer provides a much-needed appraisal of Egypt's future prospects.
https://www.amazon.com/Revolution-Undone-Egypts-Beyond-Revolt/dp/0190659734 

(Book) Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism: Illiberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy (2017)

The liberatory sentiment that stoked the Arab Spring and saw the ousting of long-time Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak seems a distant memory. Democratically elected president Mohammad Morsi lasted only a year before he was forced from power to be replaced by precisely the kind of authoritarianism protestors had been railing against in January 2011. Paradoxically, this turn of events was encouraged by the same liberal activists and intelligentsia who'd pushed for progressive reform under Mubarak.

This volume analyses how such a key contingent of Egyptian liberals came to develop outright illiberaltendencies. Interdisciplinary in scope, it brings together experts in Middle East studies, political science, philosophy, Islamic studies and law to address the failure of Egyptian liberalism in a holistic manner - from liberalism's relationship with the state, to its role in cultivating civil society, to the role of Islam and secularism in the cultivation of liberalism. A work of impeccable scholarly rigour, Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism reveals the contemporary ramifications of the state of liberalism in Egypt.

 

Contents

1. Egyptian liberals, from revolution to counterrevolution

Daanish Faruqi and Dalia F. Fahmy
 

Section I: Liberalism and The Egyptian State

2. Egypt's structural illiberalism: How a weak party system undermines participatory politics

Dalia F. Fahmy

3. Nasser's comrades and Sadat's brothers: Institutional legacies and the downfall of the Second Egyptian Republic

Hesham Sallam

4. (De)liberalizing judicial independence in Egypt

Sahar F. Aziz

 

Section II: Liberalism and Egyptian Civil Society

5. The authoritarian state's power over civil society

Ann M. Lesch

6. Myth or reality?: The discursive construction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Mohamad Elmasry

7. Student political activism in democratizing Egypt

Abdel-Fattah Mady

 

Section III: Islam, Secularism, and the State

8. Egypt's secularized intelligentsia and the guardians of truth

Khaled Abou El Fadl

9. The truncated debate: Egyptian liberals, Islamists, and ideological statism

Ahmed Abdel Meguid and Daanish Faruqi

 

Section IV: Egyptian Liberals in Comparative Perspective Post-2013

10. Conflict and reconciliation: "Arab liberalism” in Syria and Egypt

Emran El-Badawi

11. Egypt's new liberal crisis

Joel Gordon

12. Egyptian liberals and their anti-democratic deceptions: A contemporary sad narrative

Amr Hamzawy

 

Conclusion: Does liberalism have a future in Egypt?

Emad El-Din Shahin

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dalia Fahmy is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Long Island University. She lives in New Jersey. Daanish Faruqi is a PhD candidate in History at Duke University, North Carolina.

REVIEWS

‘Gives useful insights into the history of liberal though and its current situation inside and outside Egypt.'
The Muslim World Book Review
‘What emerges in the reading of the entire volume is a crisis of orientation, in which leading liberal voices in Egypt have seemingly embraced a very binary of secular progress versus religious reaction, while playing a major role in the divisive politics that have characterized the transitional period. This new crisis has led many secular liberals, facing the alleged threat of Brotherhoodization, to a reactionary embrace of the ancient regime. In this perspective, even if the book focuses its attention on Egypt, it begs a more universal question: how can liberalism overcome its current crisis?'
Reset Doc
‘I read Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism with a sigh of relief that understanding one of the most significant events in our contemporary history is in the caring and competent hands of some seminal critical thinkers. Dalia F. Fahmy and Daanish Faruqi have brought together a formidable volume challenging what they aptly call "Illiberal Intelligentsia” and gauge the future of the Egyptian democracy beyond and through their historic failures. What the community of critical thinkers gathered in this volume discover and discuss is no mere indictment of the Egyptian liberal intellectuals and their catastrophic failure at a crucial historic juncture, but something far more deeply troubling in the very nature of unexamined globalized liberalism. The result is a fiercely radical constellation of critical thinking indispensable for our understanding not just of Egypt and the rest of the Arab and Muslim world, but in fact the very legacy of liberalism in the 21st century.'
Hamid Dabashi, Hagop Kevorkian Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature, Columbia University
‘This edited volume is an essential contribution towards understanding the current state of affairs in Egypt. The different chapters offer a sense of the underlying dynamics at work within Egyptian society (among the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, secularists and the youth). The reader is invited to consider the complexity of the situation and what it will take for Egyptian people to find their way towards freedom and justice.'
Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies, University of Oxford
‘An extraordinary and wide-ranging exploration of the Arab spring's excitement and reversal in Egypt. Compulsory reading to grasp the role of Islam, secularism, authoritarianism and liberalism in contemporary Egypt.'
Ebrahim Moosa, Professor of Islamic Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame
‘The question of democracy in Muslim societies has generated heated debate on the role of mainstream Islamist parties and democratization. Can they moderate their views? Will they respect electoral outcomes? Are they committed to political pluralism? The same questions, however, have been rarely asked of liberal and secular forces who occupy the same political space. This is precisely what is unique about this book. Focusing on Egypt's Arab Spring democratic transition, it examines the political behavior of Egyptian liberals during the transition period and after the 2013 military coup. In doing so, the editors and contributors make an important and exceptional contribution to understanding both the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab-Islamic world and the obstacles to democracy. It is a must read volume that challenges stereotypes and deepens our grasp of the politics and societies of the Middle East.'
Nader Hashemi, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies, University of Denver, and author of Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies
‘The heroic events of January and February 2011 seemed at first to rewrite the rules of Middle Eastern politics. One of the longest ruling autocrats in the Arab World fell not to a military coup, an assassination, or violent uprising, but to the immovable presence of the people demonstrating in public. The Tahrir Revolution was ‘liberal' in the sense that its demands were for freedom, the rule of law, and social justice. Its promise was that these goals seemed to reflect a shared will uniting the secular and the Islamist, the masses and the middle class. Two short years later that promise was shattered in a supreme act of anti-political, counter-revolutionary violence. How did many Egyptian ‘liberals,' who two years earlier stood side by side with Islamists against Mubarak in Tahrir, and one year earlier voted for Morsi for President, come to side with a return to military dictatorship over constitutional politics? Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism brings together many of the best scholars on Egyptian politics to answer just this question.'
Andrew F. March, Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University, and author of Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus

https://oneworld-publications.com/egypt-and-the-contradictions-of-liberalism-pb.html