James Traub (Foreign Policy): "Under Biden, the Middle East Would Be Just Another Region" (Sept 9, 2020)

Biden, in short, occupied the realist wing of the Obama administration on Middle East issues. Trump might claim residence for himself in that wing, too. But if a “realist” is guided by objective interests rather than ephemeral values, then Trump’s crass and value-free mercantilism in the region has emptied that term of all meaning. He has truckled to brutal autocrats including Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman even as they have meddled in civil wars in Libya and Yemen in a way that plainly harms U.S. interests. Biden would not hesitate to criticize their behavior both at home and abroad. He has said: “I would end U.S. support for the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen and order a reassessment of our relationship with Saudi Arabia.” It would be up to Saudi Arabia, he warned, “to change its approach.”

The same principle would apply to the United Arab Emirates, which, however, has withdrawn from the Yemen war, made quiet overtures to Iran, and, of course, agreed to open diplomatic relations with Israel. Biden would strike a new, more distant, equilibrium. The former aide said that he expects Biden to “resist pressure from progressives to punish them.” He would continue working with repressive regimes even as he sought to deter them from exacerbating local conflicts.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/09/biden-is-planning-change-not-hope-for-the-middle-east/ 

Peter Mandaville: "Wahhabism in the World: The Geopolitics of Saudi Arabia’s Religious Soft Power" (Sept 30, 2019)

 

https://youtu.be/KWFiZZ5HIjI

NOI, Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X and Nasser, Islam as revolutionary solution, transnational connections

The Nation of Islam, founded by W. D. Fard Muhammad in 1930 as the Temple of Islam in Greater Detroit, was only one of the many Muslim groups established in the interwar period, but it emerged after World War II as the largest single African American Muslim organization, and by the late 1950s it was arguably the most prominent Muslim organization in the United States. [5] Like most other African American Muslim groups, whether Sunni, Ahmadi, or Moorish in religious orientation, the politics of the Nation of Islam linked the struggle for Black dignity, freedom, and self-determination in the United States to the struggles of all people of color abroad, the so-called Dark World. In its rejection of Christianity, racial integration, and other components of liberalism, the Nation of Islam became a radical symbol of anti-Americanism. [6] Unlike many Black radicals who saw an alternative in communism, however, Elijah Muhammad identified Islam as the solution to such problems. 

During the 1950s and 1960s, Nation of Islam members would debate, define, and engender this revolutionary Islam in different ways. At least some members, especially Malcolm X, saw Gamal Abdel Nasser, the revolutionary leader of the United Arab Republic (the combined state of Egypt and Syria), as a model and leader of Islamic moral and political engagement. Like others around the world, many African American Muslims and African American leftists hailed Nasser's weathering of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Some members hung pictures of him in their homes. [7] In 1958, the year during which the UAR was formed and Nasser convened a meeting of the Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo, Elijah Muhammad cabled Nasser to seek his support for the NOI. In words that seem to be crafted by Malcolm X, he urged Nasser to see their movements as branches of the same tree. "Freedom, justice, and equality for all Africans and Asians is of far-reaching importance, not only to you of the East, but also to over 17,000,000 of your long-lost brothers of African-Asian descent here in the West," the cable read.

-Edward E. Curtis IV, Muslim American Politics and the Future of US Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 2019), 36-37. 

Peter Beinart: "Obama and the Israel Lobby" (Nov. 25, 2020)

 A good piece that Dr. Hatem shared about Palestine, Israel, AIPAC, Obama and organizing/activism: 

In his new autobiography, A Promised Land, her former boss, Barack Obama, tries a different tack. He gives the reader enough information to glimpse what Washington policymaking on Israel/Palestine is really like. He details the political realities that constrained his ability to challenge Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, and will likely constrain Joe Biden’s, too. But he doesn’t spell out the implications of his narrative, perhaps because it so closely resembles the argument of one of the most incendiary foreign policy books of the last two decades: Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer’s The Israel Lobby. [...]

Obama certainly believes that US support for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank damaged US interests. That support, he writes, “continued to inflame the Arab community and feed anti-American sentiment across the Muslim world.” The bottom line: “the absence of peace between Israel and the Palestinians made America less safe.” As president, Obama tried to change that, but found his efforts stymied, in large measure, by the Israel lobby. Soon after taking office in 2009, he asked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to freeze settlement growth. Obama levels criticism at Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, whom he considered overly cautious. But he argues that “[t]here wasn’t much Abbas could give the Israelis that the Israelis couldn’t already take on their own.” So “given the asymmetry in power . . . I thought it was reasonable to ask the stronger party to take a bigger first step in the direction of peace.”

In so doing, Obama picked a fight not only with Netanyahu, but with AIPAC. “Members of both parties worried about crossing the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),” Obama writes. “Those who criticized Israeli policy too loudly risked being tagged as ‘anti-Israel’ (and possibly anti-Semitic) and confronted with a well-funded opponent in the next election.” When Obama proposed the settlement freeze, “[t]he White House phones started ringing off the hook, as members of [his] national security team fielded calls from reporters, leaders of American Jewish organizations, prominent supporters, and members of Congress, all wondering why [they] were picking on Israel . . . this sort of pressure continued for much of 2009.” Obama admits that the pressure took a toll. He writes that the “noise orchestrated by Netanyahu had the intended effect of gobbling up our time, putting us on the defensive.” Picking a fight with Israel, he declares, “exacted a domestic political cost that simply didn’t exist when I dealt with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, or any of our other closest allies.”

It’s worth lingering over that last line. Obama doesn’t just describe the pro-Israel infrastructure as powerful. He says that, because of the Israel lobby, it was harder to align US policy toward Israel with the US national interest than it was in the case of any other ally. In describing AIPAC as using its financial muscle to intimidate politicians, he is repeating a charge that helped earn Walt and Mearsheimer (and more recently, Ilhan Omar) the label of antisemites. [...]

This is Obama as feature writer, stepping back from his role as most-powerful-man-in-the-world to render—and deprecate—his fellow leaders. But it’s unfair. If the Middle Easterners were pantomiming, so was Obama. He depicts himself as an innocent, slightly naïve, bystander in this grim Levantine drama. In reality, Obama was Netanyahu’s patron—his government helped fund Israel’s military and shielded it at the UN. If Obama had deployed the full weight of American power, he could likely have ensured that the summit turned out differently. He could have transformed Israeli behavior. But he chose not to because the domestic political costs were too high. And the domestic political costs were too high, as he acknowledges earlier, because of the Israel lobby.

Obama’s real message can be found in an exchange that isn’t recounted in his book. In 2010, a man at a fundraiser reportedly asked the new president to push for a just solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Obama responded by recounting Franklin Roosevelt’s answer when the Black labor leader A. Philip Randolph implored him to do more for civil rights. “I agree with everything that you’ve said,” FDR allegedly replied, “But I would ask one thing of you, Mr. Randolph, and that is go out and make me do it.” 

 In his memoir, Obama implicitly makes the same point: That he can’t change US policy until Americans—through their activism—eliminate the political obstacles that constrain US presidents. To progressive activists, “make me do it” may sound like a politicians’ way of shifting the blame for his own lack of courage. But it’s an accurate depiction of how American politics actually works. Changing government policy toward Israel/Palestine—like changing government policy on climate change or policing—requires grassroots mobilization powerful enough to overcome entrenched interests. The presidency of Joe Biden—a man even less inclined to challenge the Israel lobby than Obama—will expose how much more of that mobilization we still require.

https://jewishcurrents.org/obama-and-the-israel-lobby/

Professor Mohammad Fadel: "Muslims, Trump and Islamic Political Ethics," (11/23/20)

The content of Islamic political ethics, of course, originates in the Quran and the Sunna, but it is also found in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.  Space constrains what can be said on this topic, but the Quran emphasizes numerous “political” virtues, such as consultation (shūrā, e.g. al-Shūrā, 42:38 ), altruism (īthār, al-Ḥashr, 59:9), rational deliberation (naẓar), honesty in dealings with others (but especially with judges) (al-Baqara, 2:188), and the faithful and prompt discharge of one’s trusts (Āl ʿImrān, 3:75). It condemned Pharaoh for his tyranny and his penchant for setting one group of his people against another (al-Qaṣaṣ, 38:4), and commanded guardians of orphans to deal with their wards’ property only in the “most beautiful manner (al-aḥsan)” (al-Anʿām, 6:152 and al-Isrāʾ, 17:34), i.e., for the benefit of the orphan not the benefit of the guardian. 

The Sunna reinforced these principles and emphasized the duty of public servants to use their skills for the public good rather than their own private interests.  The Prophet (S), for example, is reported to have said, “Whoever is entrusted with authority over any affair of my community, and does not exert himself sincerely on their behalf (lam yajtahid wa lam yanṣaḥ lahum) shall never enter Paradise.” The Prophet (S) also is reported to have said, “Religion is sincerity (al-naṣīḥa). ‘We said, “To whom, Messenger of God?”’ He said, ‘To God, His Book, His messenger, to the leaders of the Muslims, and to everyone in the Muslim community (ʿāmmatihim).’”  

The opposite of good-faith, sincere judgment for the good of the community is self-serving decision-making. The Arabic term for self-serving decision-making is muḥāba, such as when a public official exercises his discretion to further his own private interest rather than the common good, including, by appointing unqualified persons to public offices because of their personal loyalty to the appointing official rather then their dispassionate commitment to the public good. One report has the Prophet (S) say the following, “God curses anyone who is given authority over any of the affairs of the Muslim community, and then appoints someone over them who is unqualified, for his own advantage.”  

The jurists subsumed these various political virtues under the concept of integrity, ʿadāla. Integrity was an obligatory condition for every public office, with most jurist agreeing that it was required both at the time of appointment, and for the office holder to continue in his position. In other words, no one could be validly appointed to public office unless he possessed integrity at the time of appointment and did nothing to impugn his integrity after taking office.  While private morality was a component of integrity, it did not exhaust it.  Honesty in dealings, fairness, and trustworthiness were crucial components of integrity as the jurists understood this concept.  When ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb asked about a man’s integrity for purposes of admitting his testimony in a lawsuit, and someone declared him trustworthy, ʿUmar asked that man whether he ever had done business with the prospective witness in the market, travelled with him on a lengthy journey, or had been embroiled with him in a legal dispute. It was these kinds of interactions that were relevant to discover the truth about this man’s character.  When the would-be character witness said he had not, ʿUmar reportedly said, “You are ignorant about this man’s character. Your ‘knowledge,’ I think, is that you might have seen him raise his head and lower it in the mosque.”  Another report attributed to ʿUmar quoted him as saying “Look not to a man’s prayer or his fasting [to know whether he has integrity], but look to his truthfulness when he speaks, whether he faithfully discharges his trusts, and his self-restraint when he is angered.”

 https://www.altmuslimah.com/2020/11/15183/

The National (Abu Dhabi): "UAE Fatwa Council designates Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation" (11/23/20)

The UAE Fatwa Council on Monday denounced the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation and urged Muslims to steer clear of the group.

The statement came during an online meeting of the council led by Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah and supports a similar pronouncement by Saudi Arabia's Council of Senior Scholars.

The UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia have designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation. The group’s spiritual leader Yusuf Al Qaradawi is living in Qatar, despite being sentenced to life in prison in his native Egypt and being banned from France and the UK for his extremist views. The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in 1928 in Egypt.

The Council called on all Muslims to reject division and to refrain from affiliation or sympathy with groups that “work to divide the ranks and inflame discord and bloodshed”, UAE news agency WAM reported.

It reiterated that “it is not permissible to pledge allegiance to anyone other than the ruler,” and said the community should show “respect and commitment” to leaders.

 https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/gcc/uae-fatwa-council-designates-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organisation-1.1116564

Also see:

https://twitter.com/wamnews/status/1330887589658816512?s=20 (The Official Twitter feed for Emirates News Agency, WAM)

(Re-tweeted by Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah's Twitter account)

Roundtable on State Islam after the Arab Uprisings (11/23/20)

from David Warren's rejoinder:

    In the case of the UAE, a key benefit these ʿulamāʾ organisations provide comes from their value for convincing foreign powers to maintain their interests in the country’s security. Despite the significance of Bin Bayyah’s articulate “regime Islam,” to use Brown’s parlance, his value internationally likely outweighs his value domestically. After all, the UAE has an extensive security apparatus that moves swiftly to extinguish local dissent and maintains lavish rentier payments to its citizens. Consequently, the ruling family’s need for a regime Islam to buttress its legitimacy domestically is likely somewhat limited. Moreover, as Walaa Quisay has noted here, and Muhammad Amasha has pointed out elsewhere, the UAE has sponsored a diverse array of ʿulamāʾ and Muslim thinkers, ranging from Bin Bayyah to Muhammad Shahrur (d.2019).

Thus, the greater benefit that Bin Bayyah and FPPMS provide for the UAE is at the level of state-branding, an important element of foreign security policy for the Sunni Gulf monarchies. Since the Gulf states are dependent upon outside powers to preserve their security, they must brand themselves in order maintain those powers’ interest in their independence. Since the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine, that outside power has been the United States, though the establishment of a Turkish base in Qatar, closer regional links with China, and normalization agreements between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain hint at a coming shift in the status quo.

For the UAE, this state-branding has not only involved developing itself into a global centre for commerce, transportation, and finance, it has also included building a particular brand of Islamic reform. This brand intersects with the US State Department’s long-running “efforts to reshape and transform ‘Islam from within’” as part of its post-9/11 policy. This points helps us further appreciate the significance of Bin Bayyah and FPPMS’s acceptance of the hegemonic discourse that “misleading fatwas” and “competing religious claims” are the root cause of regional violence and anti-US feeling. For Bin Bayyah, the solutions to such problems lie in alleviating the Chaos of the Fatwa, interfaith dialogue, and a particular form of religious freedom[3] in place of deeper reflection on, for example, the UAE’s and/or the US’s destabilising roles in the region. This helpful obfuscation strengthens the country’s state-brand as a centre of Islamic reform in American eyes, which in turn helps maintain US interest in the Al Nahyan’s security in the face of both external and internal challenges. The fact that the UAE has been praised by the US Ambassadors-at-Large for International Religious Freedom from both the Obama and Trump administrations (David Saperstein and Sam Brownback respectively) is testament to Bin Bayyah and the FPPMS’s success in this regard. 

Looking forward to Warren's forthcoming book (should be out Jan 2021 iA), Rivals in the Gulf: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Abdullah Bin Bayyah, and the Qatar-UAE Contest Over the Arab Spring and the Gulf Crisis.

https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/41990